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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
WESTERN DIVISION 
No. 5:12-CV-683-BO
PATRICIA BORDONARO )
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) O R D E R
)
JOHNSTON COUNTY BOARD OF )
EDUCATION, )
Defendant.
This cause comes before the Court on defendant’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiff has 
responded, and the matter is ripe for ruling. For the reasons discussed below, defendant’s motion 
to dismiss is denied.
BACKGROUND
The facts as alleged in plaintiffs complaint are as follows. In November 2007, plaintiff 
was hired by defendant as a teaching assistant at Clayton High School. When she was filing out 
her employment paperwork, plaintiff was notified of a requirement that, pursuant to Policy Code 
5420, as a classified employee plaintiff must also be licensed and willing to drive a school bus in 
addition to her teaching assistant duties. Plaintiff signed documents indicating that she had been 
notified of such requirement. Plaintiff received her commercial driver’s license in March 2009 
after she was notified in April 2008 that she would need to do so. Prior to her receiving her 
commercial driver’s license and being authorized to drive a school bus, plaintiff worked in her 
role as a teaching assistant and received meets or exceeds expectations rating during performance 
appraisals. While employed by defendant, plaintiff drove a school bus on two occasions, and 
plaintiffs timekeeping and pay for her school bus duties were separate from her timekeeping and
pay as a teaching assistant.
In early 2009, plaintiff began experiencing medical symptoms, including vision loss, 
which were thought initially to be related to a pituitary tumor. Plaintiff was subsequently 
diagnosed with glaucoma, which her physician now believes to be the true cause of her vision 
loss. Plaintiff lost peripheral vision in her right eye and at times experiences blurred and double 
vision. In August 2009, plaintiff provided a note from her physician that indicated that she was 
not fit to drive a school bus. Beginning in April 2010, plaintiff received a series of forty-five day 
exemptions from her school bus driving duties. Plaintiff was told that if she could not drive a 
school bus by March 2011 she would need to apply for short term disability. Throughout this time 
period, plaintiff continued to work as a teaching assistant and also served as a school bus monitor 
on occasion.
Plaintiff spoke in May 2011 at a meeting of the Johnston County Board of Education 
Policy Review Committee requesting both a reasonable accommodation from Policy Code 5420 
for herself as well as a change to Policy Code 5420, claiming that it discriminates against persons 
with disabilities. Plaintiff was terminated from her position as a teaching assistant on June 6,
2011, due to her inability to drive a school bus because of her glaucoma-related vision loss.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff subsequently filed a charge of discrimination and an amended charge of 
discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and timely filed the instant 
action after receiving a notice of right-to-sue. In her complaint, plaintiff alleges claims for 
violations of Titles I and II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101et 
seq., and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 29 U.S.C. § 794(d). Plaintiff seeks a declaration
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that defendant’s Policy Code 5420, requiring classified employees, with some exceptions, to 
obtain a commercial driver’s license and be willing to drive a school bus, is facially 
discriminatory and discriminatory as applied to plaintiff. Plaintiff further seeks injunctive relief 
prohibiting the use of Policy Code 5420 or in the alternative requiring that exemptions be made as 
provided by law, an order reinstating plaintiff to her former position, as well as damages and 
attorneys’ fees and costs. Defendant has moved to dismiss plaintiff s complaint in its entirety 
pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) authorizes dismissal of a claim for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction. When subject matter jurisdiction is challenged, the plaintiff has the 
burden of proving jurisdiction to survive the motion. Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 
647-50 (4th Cir. 1999). “In determining whether jurisdiction exists, the district court is to regard 
the pleadings’ allegations as mere evidence on the issue, and may consider evidence outside the 
pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment.” Richmond, 
Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991). To this 
end, “the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts beyond the pleadings to show that a 
genuine issue of material fact exists.” Id. (citing Trentacosta v. Frontier Pacific Aircraft Indus., 
813 F.2d 1553, 1558-59 (9th Cir. 1987)). The movant’s motion to dismiss should be granted if 
the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the movant is entitled to prevail as a matter 
of law. Id.
Defendant contends that plaintiffs retaliation claim should be dismissed for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiffs amended EEOC charge does not include any
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narrative facts to support a claim of retaliation. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies by 
filing an EEOC charge serves to deprive the federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction over such 
claims, and the “scope of a plaintiffs right to file a federal lawsuit is determined by the charge’s 
contents.” Jones v. Calvert Group, Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 300 (2009). However, “discrimination 
claims stated in the initial charge, [as well as] those reasonably related to the original complaint, 
and those developed by reasonable investigation of the original complaint may be maintained in a 
subsequent.. . lawsuit.” Evans v. Techs. Application & Svc. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 963 (4th Cir.
1996). Plaintiff checked the “retaliation” box in her amended EEOC charge, and such a claim is 
reasonably related to and could be developed by reasonable investigation of plaintiffs disability 
discrimination charge. Accordingly, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs 
retaliation claim and dismissal is unwarranted.
II. Failure to State a Claim
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Papasan v. Attain, 478 
U.S. 265, 283 (1986). When acting on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “the court should 
accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the complaint in a light most favorable 
to the plaintiff.” Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir.1993). A complaint 
must allege enough facts to state a claim for relief that is facially plausible. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Facial plausibility means that the facts plead “allow[] the 
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged”; 
mere recitals of the elements of a cause of action supported by conclusory statements do not 
suffice. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). If the factual allegations do not nudge the 
plaintiff s claims “across the line from conceivable to plausible,” the “complaint must be
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dismissed.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
A. Wrongful Discharge
Defendant contends that plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to support the 
elements of her wrongful discharge claim. A plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of wrongful 
discharge in violation of the ADA by establishing that “(1) she is within the ADA’s protected 
class; (2) she was discharged; (3) at the time of discharge, she was performing her job at a level 
that met her employer’s legitimate expectations; and (4) her discharge occurred under 
circumstances that raise a reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination.” Haulbrook v. 
Michelin North America, 252 F.3d 696, 702 (4th Cir. 2001).' An individual is within the ADA’s 
protected class if she is a qualified individual with a disability. Id. Disability is defined by the 
ADA to mean “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life 
activities of such individual; a record of such an impairment; or being regarded as having such 
impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1 )(A)-(C).
Quali fied Individual with a Disability
Plaintiff alleges that she is disabled due to her glaucoma, a neurodegenerative disease, and 
resulting vision loss. In 2008, Congress passed amendments to the ADA in order to, inter alia, 
reject the restrictive standards established by the courts for determining whether an impairment 
substantially limits a major life activity under the ADA of 1990. Pub. L. No. 110-325, §2, 122 
Stat. 3553; rejecting specifically the standards announced in Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 
471 (1999) and Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002). By
‘The standards applicable to Title I ADA claims are also applicable to complaints arising 
under Title II of the ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See Doe v. Univ. o f Md. 
Medical Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1264-65 (4th Cir. 1995).
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adopting the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA), Congress sought to “reinstate] a broad scope of 
protection to be available under the ADA.” Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 2(b)(1). The ADAAA became 
effective on January 1, 2009, Id. at § 8, and thus plaintiffs claims are therefore to be construed 
under the more liberal standards announced in the ADAAA.
Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that she is an individual within the ADA’s protected class. 
Plaintiff states that her loss of peripheral vision substantially limits her ability to see, that she 
bumps into people and objects and must extend her arm when moving from place to place. As the 
term “substantially limits” is meant to be construed broadly, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(i), the Court 
finds that plaintiffs alleged impairment is sufficient to state a claim under the ADA. See e.g. 
Pridgen v. Dept, o f Public Works/Bureau o f Highways, No. WDQ-08-2826, 2009 WL 4726619 *4 
n.17 (D.Md. Dec. 1, 2009) (disability to be construed broadly such that loss of vision in one eye, 
even with full use of remaining eye, constitutes a disability). As the Court is considering only a 
motion to dismiss, it does not have a record before it from which to determine whether plaintiffs 
glaucoma and peripheral vision loss in fact constitute a substantial limitation on the major life 
activity of seeing, see Wyatt v. Md. Inst., No. RDB-I0-2584, 2012 WL 739096 *5 (D.Md. March 
7, 2012) (considering on summary judgment whether glaucoma constitutes substantial limitation), 
but it notes that pre-ADAAA cases may in fact “carry little, if any, precedential weight with 
respect to the issue of [disability]”. Feldman v. Law Enforcement Assocs. Corp., 779 F. Supp.2d 
472, 483 n.3 (E.D.N.C. 2011). Furthermore, whether or not her physicians believed her vision 
loss to be caused by a pituitary tumor or glaucoma is of no import as “the ADAAA does not 
require a plaintiff to have a formal 'diagnosis’ in order to be ‘disabled.’” Hutchinson v. Ecolab, 
Inc., No. 3:09CV1848, 2011 WL 4542957, *9 n.10 (D. Conn. Sept. 28, 2011).
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Plaintiff has also sufficiently alleged that she was regarded as being disabled, as she was 
several times excused from bus driving duty and was told that she would need to apply for short 
term disability if she could not return to driving duty. See e.g. Chamberlain v. Valley Health Sys., 
Inc., 781 F. Supp. 2d 305, 311 (W.D.Va. 2011) (jury could find that plaintiff with blurred vision 
was regarded as having a disability when supervisor told plaintiff she could not work due to her 
vision problems and required her to apply for disability leave).
Finally, plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to support a claim that she was a qualified 
individual. An individual is qualified if she can perform the essential functions of the job, with or 
without a reasonable accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Accepting as true the well-pleaded 
allegations in plaintiffs complaint, plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that bus driving was not an 
essential function of plaintiffs teaching assistant position. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (listing 
types of evidence that may be considered in determining whether a duty is an essential function). 
Moreover, plaintiff has alleged that with a reasonable accommodation of allowing her to serve as 
a bus monitor instead of bus driver plaintiff could perform bus duties as required. The 
reasonableness of a requested accommodation is a question of fact, see Pandazides v. Va. Bd. o f 
Educ., 13 F.3d 823, 833 (4th Cir. 1994), and thus is not appropriately dismissed at this stage so 
long as plaintiff has pleaded sufficiently to state her claim.
Job Performance, Termination, and Inference o f Discrimination 
Plaintiff has also alleged sufficient facts from which the Court may draw a reasonable 
inference that she was performing her duties as a teaching assistant in manner that met her 
employer’s legitimate expectations. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Plaintiff has alleged that she 
received meets or exceeds expectations on each job performance review, including the final
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appraisal that occurred just prior to plaintiffs termination. While defendant contends that 
plaintiffs inability to drive a school bus requires a finding that she was not meeting her 
employer’s legitimate expectations, such a finding cannot not be made without first considering 
plaintiffs claims that Policy Code 5420 is facially discriminatory and that driving a school bus is 
not an essential function of plaintiffs primary position as a teaching assistant.
Plaintiff has also alleged that she was terminated following her requests for reasonable 
accommodation in a manner that raises a reasonable inference of discrimination. Plaintiffs 
complaint states that she requested reasonable accommodation in the form of exemption from bus 
driving duties and plaintiff was terminated within weeks of speaking publically about the 
discriminatory effect of Policy Code 5420 and her requests for accommodation.
B. Retaliation
Such allegations also sufficiently support plaintiff s claim for retaliation. In order to 
establish a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show that she engaged in protected activity, that her 
employer took adverse employment action against her, and that there is a causal link between the 
two. Haulbrook, 252 F.3d at 706. Requests for accommodation are protected activity, and a three 
week period between protected activity and firing is sufficient to establish prima facie causation. 
Id. Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiffs retaliation claim is facially plausible.
“A complaint ‘need only give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the 
grounds upon which it rests.’” Coleman v. Md. Ct. App., 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir 2010) 
(quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). Additionally, a plaintiff need not plead 
sufficient facts to make a prima facie showing of her claims, but rather must allege sufficient facts 
to “raise the right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
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Plaintiff has done so in her complaint, and as such dismissal at this stage of the proceedings is
unwarranted.2
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, defendant’s motion to dismiss [DE 11] is 
DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this f  [  day of April, 2013.
2Notably, each, if not the great majority, of the cases relied upon by defendant deal with 
the sufficiency of an ADA claim at the summary judgment stage; the Court need only determine 
here whether plaintiffs complaint sufficiently alleges a right to relief.
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